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Monetary Flexibility in Dependent 
Economies1 
The present currency board system in East Africa will clearly give way, 
either by evolution or by more rapid change, to some form of central banking 
system. What form this system will take is an issue still in doubt. All sorts of 
variations on the themes of centralization and decentralization have been 
suggested and are possible. The final choice will be decided at least as much 
by political as by economic factors. In this paper I do not propose 
to comment directly on the form that central banking institutions should 
take. Instead I shall discuss a number of closely related issues which bear on 
the scope of central banking action in East Africa. I shall assume that the 
common currency will be maintained but this is not essential to any of my 
arguments which would apply, mutatis mutandis, to each territory separately 
should the decision be taken to break up the currency area. The questions 
that I shall consider are these: 
1. Credit creation and the fiduciary issue. 
2. Monetary flexibility and the fiduciary issue. 
3. Monetary flexibility and economic growth. 
4. Money supply and external reserves. 
C R E D I T CREATION AND THE F I D U C I A R Y ISSUE 
Walter Newlyn, reviewing the functions of a central bank gives as his first 
two, 'currency issue' and 'credit creation', and he indicates that in the light 
of the territories' needs and the way these functions are performed at present, 
the time is ripe for a central bank in East Africa.2 What does he mean by 
'credit creation'? At one point early in his article he appears to equate credit 
creation with the circulation of currency on a fiduciary basis.3 At other points, 
and notably in the mathematical appendix to his article, it is clear that he 
does not make this identification. But as it also appears in the wording of the 
reports of the East African Board4 it is worthwhile considering the relation 
between credit creation and the fiduciary issue. 
The term 'credit creation' suggests a process of monetary expansion. The 
'credit' normally referred to here is bank credit: it is created as the result of 
an increase in bank lending which, in turn, is usually considered as leading 
to an increase in the volume of net bank liabilities—-whether banknotes or 
deposits or both—outstanding. As banking liabilities, notes and deposits, 
make up the money stock, the term 'credit creation' usually implies an 
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increase in the supply of money. The first point I wish to examine is how far 
an increase in the fiduciary issue of East Africa is likely to lead to an increase 
in the money supply under present conditions. 
The East African Currency Board has the power to issue notes on a fidu-
ciary basis either against securities of the East African governments or 
against crop finance paper (rediscounted by the banks). The present fiduciary 
limits are £35 millions against government securities and £10 millions for 
crop finance. At 30 June 1964 the composition of the domestic securities 
held by the Board was as follows: 
Domestic Securities held by the EACB 30 June 1964. 
£ millions 
Treasury bills 3.83 
Crop finance advances 0.75 
Short-dated (1-5 years) 1.12 
Medium-dated (6-10 years) 2.17 
Long-dated (over 10 years) 6.43 
14.30 
Total assets (including external assets) 75.88 
Source : Report of EACB, 1964. pp. 42, 50. 
1 propose to exclude from consideration here increases in the fiduciary 
issue in response to such temporary needs as the seasonal requirements of 
government and crop finance, and to confine the analysis to the use of the 
fiduciary issue as a source of more permanent finance, in the interests of 
long-run development policy. The possible trains of events following an 
increase in the fiduciary issue may be illustrated in the following four 
examples. 
(i) First, let us assume that the Currency Board agrees to make £10 
millions of finance available to the East African governments, to finance 
part of their development plans. One way in which this operation might be 
carried out is for the Board to subscribe lo new securilies issued by the 
governments by the tender of sterling which the Board acquires by liquidating 
some of its external assets. This might be done where the governments 
needed foreign exchange lo cover their overseas disbursements in connection 
with the plan expenditures. Leaving aside, for the time being, the question 
of any concurrent domestic expenditures, what would be the effects of this 
particular transaction? For the Currency Board it would amount to a 
straight substitution of internal for external securities. For the economy of 
East Africa there would have been a substitution of real assets for foreign 
exchange assets. The domestic monetary situation however would be exactly 
as it was before—except that part of the currency circulation which before was 
'non-fiduciary', i.e. backed by external assets, would now be designated 
'fiduciary'; but the size of the money stock would be unchanged. To describe 
this particular expansion of the fiduciary issue as 'credit creation' is clearly 
misleading. 'Credit diversion' would be a more appropriate description: part 
Monetary Flexibility in Dependent Economies 3 
of that fund of saving which is congealed in the monetary circulation has 
been withdrawn from one kind of externally-acquired asset, foreign exchange, 
and reinvested in another, imported equipment. 
How realistic is this example? Would the governments in fact wish to take 
Currency Board finance in this form? The answer is that this is indeed not 
the typical way in which the Board provides such finance at present. But it 
is always open to the governments to draw on their share of fiduciary issue 
finance in this form5 and one East African government does do so. Further-
more, as the pace of development under the published plans accelerates, 
foreign exchange needs will grow and this kind of direct drawing on the 
foreign exchange assets of the Board will probably increase. 
It is the case, however, that at present the typical method by which an 
East African government obtains finance, within its 'fiduciary quota', runs 
along lines which, formally at any rate, differ from this first example. The 
normal procedure is for the government to sell securities to the Board in 
return for a straight credit, in the Board's books, to the clearing account of 
the government's banking agent. At one time the sale was effected by a 
straight transfer of notes to the government concerned; but since the in-
stitution of clearing accounts, held by the commercial banks with the Board, 
the initial step takes the form of a credit. This introduces our second example. 
(ii) Here we assume that, as before, the governments wish to raise £10 
millions of finance from the Currency Board; but in this case the money is 
required for internal expenditures. The primary effect of the transaction is 
that the Board's assets increase by the domestic securities acquired, while its 
liabilities, in the form of deposits in clearing accounts, rise by an equal 
amount. The bankers to the various governments will credit their clients' 
accounts with the balances acquired, and their own assets will rise by the 
increase in their clearing balances. Now the commercial banks of East Africa, 
while they maintain these clearing accounts with the Board, do not normally 
keep large balances in them.6 The probability is therefore that unless the 
money is to be spent very quickly, the banks will convert their balances 
with the Board into sterling which they will place, at interest, in London. 
The Board's sterling assets will therefore decline, pari passu, with their 
deposit liabilities. 
The borrowing governments now proceed to spend the funds on domestic 
projects. This will cause an increase in money incomes and expenditures in 
East Africa and the currency needs of the public will increase. The commercial 
banks will have to meet this need by surrendering sterling to the Board in 
return for notes. But this sterling will, so to speak, 'come out of ' the sterling 
assets acquired by the governments' bankers when the Board subscribed for 
the securities. (With the expenditure of the funds by the governments this 
sterling will have been spread among all the banks in the system as balances 
are transferred through the clearing). The result up to this point will be a 
rise in the currency circulation of the Board which, for the lime being, we 
will assume equals the original transfer of finance to the governments. 
. But what of the further effects of the governments' spending? These will 
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depend very much on the propensity of East Africans to buy imported goods; 
on the existence or otherwise of spare capacity in the economy; and on the 
propensity of the public to save.7 If this finance is extended and spent in a 
situation where the supply of domestic goods is completely inelastic then 
(ignoring effects both on domestic prices and on the supply of exports) the 
propensity to import will rise to unity and an amount of imports equal to 
the expenditures will be fairly promptly sucked in. These imports will be 
paid for, in the final analysis, with the sterling which the East African com-
mercial banks originally acquired as the result of the Currency Board's 
subscription for the domestic securities. At the same time there will be an 
accompanying reduction in the currency circulation as the public spends its 
increased holdings of currency on imported goods. The final outcome will 
be exactly as in the first example: there will be a substitution of real assets 
for foreign exchange assets with no increase in the money supply. Again, 
an example of 'credit diversion'. 
(iii) For our third case let us assume that initially everything happens as 
in the last example, but that the supply of domestic goods and services is 
capable of expansion. In this example we will assume that no part of any 
increase in income is saved, but that part of income is spent on imported 
goods. In this situation expenditure of their acquired funds by the govern-
ments will lead to some increase in real output in East Africa. Just how far 
this will go will depend on the size of the propensity to import. If people 
normally spend a high proportion of their incomes on imported goods then 
the expansive effects of the governments' expenditures on real output will be 
heavily damped. If the propensity to import is low the effect on domestic 
output will be correspondingly greater. But low or high the fact that a pro-
portion of expenditure out of income is on imports will cause a loss of 
foreign exchange and a concomitant drop in money supply. Furthermore, 
provided no new saving is being performed, the induced imports will in the 
end equal the initial governmental expenditures; foreign exchange assets will 
decrease by this amount; and the money supply will subside to its original 
level.8 The monetary outcome, in this case, is exactly as before: the currency 
circulation will be the same as it was at the outset, but a larger amount of it 
will be fiduciary. In real terms there will have been a substitution of real 
assets (the induced imports) for foreign exchange assets, but there will also 
have been something else. The expenditures by the governments will have 
induced some rise in domestic output, so that the total increase in the real 
assets available to the economy will exceed the decline in foreign exchange 
assets. In this case, while there has been no permanent increase in the money 
supply there has been a temporary 'creation of credit' which has produced 
an addition to real assets. 
(iv) Finally let us assume not only that domestic supply can increase, 
in the face of higher expenditure, but also that some part of the higher 
incomes generated is saved by the recipients. As before a part of income is 
spent on imported goods, and this results in a decline in the money stock and 
a drain on foreign exchange assets. But the incidence of saving may prevent 
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this going as far as in the previous example. The outcome depends on the 
form in which the saved income is held. If the income, on being saved, is 
lent through the capital market or through financial institutions other than 
the commercial banks, so that it re-enters the expenditure stream, then the 
final outcome is the same as in example (iii).9 If however the saved income 
is held either in currency or in commercial bank deposits there will be a 
somewhat different outcome. 
To the extent that the process of expenditure-and-income generation, set 
off by the initial governmental expenditures, results in a higher holding of 
currency by the East African public, the volume of currency in circulation 
will remain above its original figure, and the sterling assets of the Currency 
Board will decline by something less than the original increase in the fidu-
ciary issue. If the size of this original increase in the fiduciary issue was 
decided in the expectation, and with the intention, that it would eventually 
produce an equal reduction in external assets, then clearly a further extension 
of fiduciary finance will now be possible. In this case there has been a 
creation of credit with more permanent effects in the shape of a higher fund 
of saving permanently available. 
If now we assume that part of the savings out of the higher income is 
placed in deposits with the commercial banks, yet another possibility is 
introduced. The effect of this (ignoring many intermediate details) will be 
to increase the liquid assets of the commercial banks: in the practical context 
of East African banking short-term assets in London will increase. There 
has been no evidence in recent years that the banks aim at any constant 
ratio between their liquid assets and their local deposit liabilities, but we 
will assume that an increase in their liquid assets does in fact make them 
willing to expand their lending in East Africa and that suitable borrowers 
present themselves. 
The expansion of bank credit which will result from this increase in lending 
will finance a further series of expenditures and generate more income; and 
as before, if the supply of domestic goods and services can accommodate 
this further increase in effective demand, there will be a rise in domestic 
real output. But the increased expenditures from this source will have the 
effect of inducing a further increment of imports and this will cause a 
drain of foreign exchange assets both from the banks and from the Currency 
Board.10 (There will also be some transfer of sterling assets from the banks 
to the Board since the currency holdings of the public will probably rise 
following the expansion of bank credit). If the banks adjust their lending 
correctly they will be able to reach a new position of equilibrium in which 
their loans, liquid assets and deposits are all at a higher level than before.11 
This final variant of case (iv) points to another qualification of the identi-
fication of 'credit creation' with an increase in the fiduciary note issue. In 
this case there is credit creation leading to an expansion of real output. But 
part of the credit created is commercial bank credit and is not normally 
made available to the governments for financing their own expenditures, 
except to a minor extent. If the governments wish to secure for themselves 
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the financial benefit of all the credit created as a result of the extension of 
the fiduciary issue they must take steps to ensure that the increased lending 
power of the commercial banks, consequent on the increase in their liquid 
assets, is used to acquire public securities. 
M O N E T A R Y FLEXIBILITY AND THE FIDUCIARY ISSUE 
In recent discussion of the central bank question in East Africa there is a 
tendency to equate flexibility in the money supply with an enlarged fiduciary 
element within the currency issue. This is a technical question, but it is 
worth examining it before we go on, in the next section, to consider the 
larger questions of monetary elasticity. 
There are two preliminary points to make. Flexibility in the currency is 
indeed a precondition of elasticity in the total money supply. Even where 
currency is a subsidiary medium of exchange it is normally demanded in a 
stable ratio to the dominant medium, bank deposits; thus an appreciable 
rise in the money supply is only possible if the currency component can 
increase. Secondly, it may be remarked that the present system of currency 
issue in East Africa does possess flexibility of a kind. The currency can 
increase. Such an increase requires an accretion of sterling assets by East 
Africa as a whole and this depends on a favourable balance of payments. 
But in an export-based economy such a favourable external balance tends to 
occur naturally as people accumulate currency balances. However, the point 
to note here is that when people argue, as they do, forgreaterflexibility in the 
currency issue they are arguing for a loosening of the link between money 
supply and the external balance. Just how far a dependent economy can 
loosen this link is a question to which we return later. 
Turning now to the mechanism of fiduciary issue it needs to be said that 
in itself this system of issue is not necessarily a source of flexibility. The 
original pattern of all fiduciary issues, that given to the Bank of England in 
1844, formed part of a system which was specifically designed to exclude 
flexibility in the currency; other than that permitted by the external balance. 
The system then established embodied a fixed fiduciary limit, with power to 
issue currency in excess of the limit, one-for-one, against gold. In principle 
this is exactly the system now in force in East Africa: the Currency Board 
may issue currency up to £35 million against domestic securities (plus £10 
millions of crop finance); but beyond that its notes must be backed, one-for-
one, by external assets. 
When such a system is altered to the extent of allowing a once-for-all 
increase in the fiduciary limit, there is an access of flexibility, but it may be 
no more than temporary. Should the needs of public finance drive the Board 
up to its limit the position would revert to what it was before'.increases in the 
currency would accompany an accretion of external assets. What is required, 
of course, is an arrangement whereby the fiduciary limit itself may be re-
viewed or exceeded in particular circumstances. Such arrangements are 
possible and do indeed exist. But once scope for flexibility is admitted other 
problems arise. There is a conflict between flexibility and the maintenance 
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of statutory restraints on the monetary authority. The point of any limitation 
on the fiduciary issue is to circumscribe the power of the monetary authorities 
in some degree: by allowing them to vary the issue, the strength of the 
restraint is inevitably diminished. Tt is comparatively easy to legislate for 
semi-automatic increases in the fiduciary issue—say, a rise of so much per 
year—but this is not the only kind of flexibility that is required. A true 
central bank needs some measure of short-run elasticity and this is more 
difficult to combine with statutory restraints.12 The question may well, of 
course, be asked: why link the currency to the external reserve at all? This 
is a pertinent issue to which we return later; but however it is answered it 
does not dispose of the problem of statutory restraints on the monetary 
authority. 
MONETARY F L E X I B I L I T Y AND E C O N O M I C G R O W T H 
A monetary system serving an economy of any degree of commercial deve-
lopment requires some elasticity in the total supply of money, as well as in its 
various components. In a dependent economy the simplest type of elasticity 
is that needed to meet seasonality in the inflow of income. Where hard 
currency is the major means of payment the need is for a currency that can 
expand as the crop season reaches its climax in the harvesting and move-
ment of produce. The currency board system would appear to be well adapt-
ed to provide this kind of flexibility since the exportation of the crop auto-
matically provides the foreign exchange against which the currency is issued. 
As incomes are spent the 100 per cent, backing of external assets (at the 
margin) ensures that the high expenditure on imported goods is automa-
tically covered by foreign exchange. 
But the adaptation is only partial. The fact is that crops must be paid for, 
and the circulation expanded, in advance of actual exportation and therefore 
in advance of foreign exchange receipts. The system has depended therefore, 
in the past, on a seasonal importation of funds by expatriate trading com-
panies and banks. These funds have provided both the short-period finance 
needed for the moving of the crops,13 and the sterling assets required to 
expand the currency issue in advance of export receipts. Furthermore where 
bank deposits are a significant element in the monetary system a currency 
board which possesses no more than the traditional powers of such a body 
contributes nothing to their flexibility; this again must depend on expatriate 
banks with reserves held outside the country. However, following the recent 
extension of its powers and functions, the East African Currency Board 
is in a position to meet these needs: its £10 millions of fiduciary issue for 
crop finance may be employed either to increase the currency circulation or 
to reinforce the liquid assets of the commercial banks, at the time of crop 
movement. 
Another type of flexibility is that involved in a central bank's function as 
lender of last resort. In the more extreme cases in which the need for this 
arises—situations of financial crisis and panic—what is needed is the ability 
indefinitely to substitute acceptable claims on the monetary authority for 
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temporarily unacceptable claims on other transactors. This clearly demands 
some kind of emergency arrangements to expand the money supply, arrange-
ments which pose technical problems and which raise issues of statutory 
control, but which we defer to the next section. 
Thirdly, in a growing economy there is a need for secular, or long-term, 
elasticity in the money supply. As incomes rise and the volume of money 
transactions increases there is a rising demand for money. If this is not met, 
there will be a deflationary drag on the economy. Mr. G. Lomoro14 and 
Professor Paul Clark15 propose to turn this phenomenon into a positive 
advantage, as a source of finance, to the governments of East Africa. Their 
thesis, which I shall call the Lomoro-Clark thesis, is that by a given date, 
1970, a certain possible expansion of the national income may be postulated, 
on the assumption of particular rates of growth of the East African economy. 
They then argue that, on the basis of past ratios between the growth of 
income and various components of the money stock, we can predict how 
much growth in the money stock will be required, by 1970, in order to avoid 
deflationary effects. Finally, it is claimed, economic expansion will be posi-
tively assisted if the money stock is actually caused to grow by the predicted 
amount. This final step in the argument is linked to a further thesis of Pro-
fessor Clark that the main block to expansion in East Africa lies not in a 
shortage of saving, or foreign exchange, or trained manpower, but of public 
finance.16 The expansion of the money supply is thus seen as necessary to 
avoid a deflationary, drag on development and also as a vital source of 
funds for government. 
At the outset may I say that I do not dispute the point of departure of 
this argument: demand for money does grow with the national income, 
and this provides a fund of saving which may, and indeed should, be tapped. 
However, there are two aspects of the Lomoro-Clark model on which I wish 
to comment. The first concerns factors making for variability in the equili-
brium relationship between the money stock and the national income. 
Professor Clark notes17 that the rate of turnover of the money stock is an 
important variable in the monetary situation: a given volume of monetary 
transactions may be carried on either by a larger amount of money or a 
higher rate of turnover of money. But one gains the impression that Clark 
regards the velocity of circulation as a more or less dependent variable which, 
given the money stock, adapts itself—perhaps incompletely—to the monetary 
needs of the economy. Personally I am rather doubtful of the existence of 
an adaptive mechanism involving a more rapid movement of money in the 
transactions circuit, but this is not the point that I wish to stress here. What 
I would maintain is that the velocity of circulation can behave as an inde-
pendent variable and that, as an economy develops, changes in the financial 
structure tend naturally to produce changes in it. The relevant changes are 
the growth of non-bank financial intermediaries and the development of 
the capital market. These developments by increasing the quantity and 
variety of financial assets, and the ease with which they may be bought and 
sold, tend to decrease the asset demand for money. The effect of this in a 
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closed economy would be to increase the velocity of circulation and, assum-
ing the money stock was independently determined, to cause the price level to 
be higher than it otherwise would be. In an open economy the results are 
more complex and may include some diminution of the stock of money, or 
at any rate a diminution of its rate of growth. 
But in a developing economy there is an important factor working in the 
opposite direction to all this. The extension of the money economy creates 
a rising demand for money balances, and by itself this would permit a larger 
expansion of the money stock than would otherwise be consistent with 
stable prices. This trend may indeed counterbalance the elfects of changing 
financial structure, but it is impossible to predict in advance what the relative 
strengths of these two developments will be. This uncertainty about major 
variables in the system points the need for extreme caution and care in 
embarking on monetary expansion; and this need is underlined by another 
characteristic of monetary systems. In my view the possibilities of wide 
short-term variations in the velocity of circulation develop at quite an early 
stage in the growth of a monetary system. In a system of any maturity—and 
the East African system is mature enough—transactions balances are rarely 
near the minimum necessary for comfort, while there always exist consider-
able 'savings' balances of money which can be fed into the transactions 
circuit. This variability presents a danger of instability which will pose a 
problem of management in the context of a reformed monetary system in 
East Africa. The total effect of all these qualifications is, in my opinion, to 
preclude any automatic programme of monetary expansion. Expansion will 
be possible but the monetary authority will have to proceed empirically, 
with its eye on the immediately visible landscape rather than the distant 
horizon. This conclusion (to which, it must be said, Professor Clark himself 
gives support) is reinforced by the consideration that the increases in real 
income, on which the stability of the expansion process depends, are never 
a foregone conclusion. 
My second comment on the Lomoro-Clark thesis refers to the external 
factor. It is the eternal lot of dependent economies that the scope for inde-
pendent action is narrowly circumscribed by the balance of payments.18 A 
high marginal propensity to import ensures that any expansion of money 
income leads quickly to a rise in imports which, unless there is a concomitant 
rise in exports, or an inflow of capital, puts pressure on the external balance. 
Now the Lomoro-Clark model strikes me as essentially a closed economy 
model: it makes no explicit reference to the external relations of the system.19 
Its equilibrium criterion is the maintenance of stable prices. But in an open 
economy, under conditions of dynamic growth, a stable price level is no 
guarantee of external equilibrium. Unless, therefore, one expects East 
African growth to be of the export-led variety, and this seems an unlikely 
prospect, the dependence of continued growth on an unpredictable balance 
of payments must be recognized. 
Of course it may be said that this throws a pessimistic light on any policy 
for growth, and this is true. Also it has been assumed so far that the economy 
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of East Africa will remain substantially 'open' and this is not necessarily the 
policy that will be followed. Failing a satisfactory development of exports, 
or of other foreign exchange receipts, it may be decided in the interests of 
faster growth to apply a policy of import control. Alternatively, devalua-
tion of the East African shilling might be considered. There would be ad-
vantages and disadvantages to both these policies and they would have to 
be weighed in the balance with the domestic objectives. But whatever policy 
is followed this problem of the external limitation must be faced in some 
way. It may be that currently the balance of payments is fairly healthy, but 
once an expansion rate of (say) 5 per cent, per annum is established the 
position could change very rapidly. 
M O N E Y S U P P L Y AND EXTERNAL R E S E R V E S 
My final question is to ask what, if any, is the desirable relation between 
external reserves and the internal monetary system in a dependent economy. 
The present currency board system is characterized by a very close tie-up 
between the two. The practical object of the system is to obviate the possibi-
lity of a balance of payments problem; or, more precisely, to prevent econo-
mic disturbances and maladjustments from taking the form of a payments 
problem. In fact, the development of the East African system to the point 
where bank deposits are a significant form of money has meant that a device 
for guaranteeing 100 per cent, convertibility to the currency cannot do that 
for the total money stock.20 However, no independent monetary system 
requires a level of external revenue which absolutely guarantees the convert-
ibility of its total money stock, or of anything like it. The present system of 
linking the currency and the external reserve must be judged on its appro-
priateness, both technically and in terms of the reserves which it produces. 
First, the question of the level of reserves. No one, I think, would argue 
that the present system produces an inadequate external reserve. Indeed, 
both Professor Clark and Mr. Newlyn have argued the view, which most 
people would accept, that the level of foreign exchange assets imposed by the 
present arrangements is excessive. But this defect could be adjusted relatively 
easily by an increase in the fiduciary element of the currency on lines which 
were explored in the first section of this paper. With a larger, but still fixed, 
fiduciary issue the external reserve would be smaller, but it would still be 
linked at the margin to changes in the currency circulation. Provided we 
admitted the need for some periodical revision of the fiduciary limit to 
combat the tendency for reserves to become excessive again with the passage 
of time (as the currency circulation grows), this is a perfectly feasible system 
of linkage between money supply and reserves. There is, however, one 
apparent technical objection to it that requires comment. 
It may be objected that the linking of reserves to marginal changes in the 
currency implicitly recognizes the claims to convertibility only of currency 
and not of the other component of the money stock, bank deposits. This is 
a valid objection but it can be met by modifying the system to include the 
deposit liabilities of the central bank with the currency in the quantity which 
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is linked to the foreign exchange reserve. Then, so long as the commercial 
banks hold balances with the central banks—and une assumes that in a 
reformed system such balances would replace their present external assets— 
there would be, as it were, a formal avenue along which convertibility of 
bank deposits might proceed. This would introduce a certain minor difference 
into the system in that it would mean that the linkage between the external 
reserves and the bank deposit component of the money stock would rest on 
a basis of proportionality (through the cash reserve ratios of the commercial 
banks) and not on the one-for-one basis governing the currency/reserve 
linkage. 
But there is a more serious objection to linking external reserves to the 
money stock. It is that the desirable level of external reserves is by no means 
a function of the domestic money supply. Basically it is the variability of the 
flows of external payments which determines the need for foreign exchange 
reserves, and although the internal monetary situation is one factor affecting 
these flows, there are other important determinants. Ideally, the need for 
reserves should be determined empirically by observation of the past be-
haviour of, and present trends in, trade, prices and international money 
flows. However, if some simple index of need is sought the absolute level of 
a country's trade is a more suitable quantity to fix on than its domestic 
money stock.21 
An issue which came up earlier, and which is closely tied up with this 
problem, is that of furnishing suitable restraints on the monetary authority. 
The fact is that the linking of the money supply to external reserves does 
provide a convenient political limitation on the actions of the monetary 
authorities. Furthermore this linkage is by no means irrelevant to the pur-
poses in view. There is, as I have said, no simple relation between the absolute 
size of the money stock and the desirable level of reserves; but there is 
nevertheless some functional connection between changes in these two quan-
tities. A rising quantity of money can be a cause of a weakening balance 
of payments; and, while opinions may differ as to its degree of effectiveness, 
a compression of the money stock is not an irrelevant response to a declining 
reserve. However, these two situations themselves point to a distinction in 
the significance of a restraint on the money stock. A statutory limitation of 
this kind may aim at preventing inflationary increases in the money supply; 
or it may have the object of enforcing a particular response—a tight money 
policy— in the face of declining reserves. In any given context a rule of this 
kind may, of course, have both objectives in view, but opinion on the 
effectiveness of the rule may distinguish between the two. It is a perfectly 
consistent position to hold that a statutory link between money stock and 
reserves is an effective and reasonable means of checking inflationary 
increases in the quantity of money, but that monetary restriction is not an 
invariably appropriate policy in the face of declining reserves. 
At this point we should recall a dilemma which we noticed earlier. The 
requirements of domestic monetary policy may call for elasticity in the money 
stock, even in the more limiting context of a dependent economy. But it is 
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difficult to meet the need for flexibility and retain the discipline of statutory 
limitations on money supply. However, the very conditions under which a 
dependent economy operates may offer a way out of this difficulty. The speed 
with which an inflationary internal policy produces an impact on the foreign 
exchange reserves of this type of economy may be such that a statutory 
check, which ideally operates as an advance warning, loses some of its point. 
Also it is arguable that the existence of such a powerful 'natural' check 
moderates the need for statutory measures. Possibly the best arrangement 
is to set a low legal minimum ratio of reserves to money stock, to act as a 
'distant' warning and point the dangers into which internal policies can lead, 
but to expect the authorities to operate well above it. This would give the 
necessary elbow room for domestic monetary policy, while the general level 
of the reserve could be attuned to the expected variability of the foreign 
balance. If this appeared to demand an implausible degree of self discipline 
on the part of the monetary authorities then perhaps a more complicated 
system could be devised: for example, one that combined a minimum legal 
ratio of reserves to money supply with, above this, a range of ratios within 
which no increases in the money supply would be permitted. This Would 
place some constraints on action but it would avoid imposing inappropriately 
restrictive policies in some situations of external deficit. However, any 
system other than one that completely severed the link between money 
supply and external reserves would require to provide loopholes to meet 
crisis conditions. 
University College, Nairobi, and M. GASKIN 
University of Glasgow. 
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